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LIVERYMAN'S
R E P L Y

T O

Sir *Crisp Gascoigne's*

A D D R E S S.

Shewing that GENTLEMAN'S

Real M O T I V E S,

A N D H I S

Whole C O N D U C T,

C O N C E R N I N G

Canning and Squires.

L O N D O N:

Printed for W. REEVE, opposite *Crane-Court,*
Fleet-street.

MDCCLIV.

[Price One Shilling.]

Canning & Co.

LIVERMAN'S

REPORT

TO

Sir George G. G. G.

ADDRESSES

Showing the Gentlemen's

REAL MOTIVES

AND HIS

WIFE CONDUCT

CONCERNING

Cunning and Spies.

LONDON

Printed for W. Kearsley, at the Old Bailey

1794

Price 6s

[Price 6s]



A

L I V E R Y M A N ' s R E P L Y , & c .



HERE is an old Proverb,
Sir *Crisp Gascoigne*, that says,
A fool's bolt is soon shot. I
beg pardon for not saying first
I meant it of myself; but they
won't mistake: Your *Thunder-*
bolt has been long enough in coming.

It is a very civil Address; and you are a
very civil knight, as ever the sword royal fell
upon! it is a very singular honour you have
been pleased to confer upon us; we shall ever
retain of it the most grateful remembrance:
and I cannot think, but so dutiful an Address
merits a most gracious Answer.

A 2

You

You owed it as a duty to us, because we were your Constituents; and you were resolved to do your duty! *that* was your *motive*, that was your *real* motive, and that was your *only* motive for doing it, — no man alive will doubt you.

If any Lord Mayor was ever constituted by the Livery before, to be sure he has done just the same; because it was his duty too! — but I forget. All Lord Mayors of *London* are not Sir *Crisp Gascoigne's*; it is not every supreme magistrate that can transport a *Bet Canning*, or kill a *Wat Tyler*.

Sir *Crisp Gascoigne*, glorious Sir *Crisp Gascoigne*, immortal Sir *Crisp Gascoigne*, was at first the patron of innocence, and now he is the vindicator of the City's honour: to be sure he had then no other motive to take the part of the poor Gipsy; to be sure he has now no other view in vindicating of his conduct. Who ever thought he had! no man in the World can think it. — A *Daniel* come to *Judgment*! yea a *Daniel*.

Great Sir, we reverence your glorious efforts; the City of *London* is obliged to you; the laws of *England* thank you; you have supported the honour of the one, you have preserved the innocence of the other; which else would have been made murtherers; and you are worthy to grace a higher sign at *Wallworth*.

So

So long as disinterested virtue shall have praise, the name of that Lord Mayor of *London* shall be had in remembrance, who took the part of an innocent Gipsej, against the sentence of that Court where he presided; seeking no popularity, nor remembering the approach of an Election!

These, Sir, being my sentiments, how could I be longer silent!

It is with pleasure I hear all men, since this great publication, speak of you, Sir, as they ought; for I love every man should have his due.

It is a transport to me to read the effects of it in the *Daily Advertiser*. I forgot what was that man's name who set the church on fire, that people might have something to say about him: *it is a good thing*, says he, *to be talked of any way*.

I rejoice to read of those *many worthy Gentlemen that had been misled by their compassion, or had been imposed upon by the artifices of designing men; but are convinced by your Address of CANNING'S IMPOSTURE*.

Only one thing vexes and surprizes me: I never found one of these convinced Gentlemen *out of the News Paper*.

All unprejudiced people that I ever met with, always thought of *Canning* alike, and I find them think just the same now as they us'd to do. All but one set of people are agreed

greed what they should think of her : but perhaps you'll ask me by this time what I think of you. Upon my credit I think you to be, what the poet calls, *the noblest work of God*, that is my serious opinion of the right worshipful Sir *Crisp Gascoigne*.

You'll ask me if I don't think you disinterested? without doubt! impartial? O! for a certainty! a worthy magistrate? indeed I do.

Come, I'll tell you what I think of you; I think you to be a very honest man, who would do a very honest thing, to serve a very honest purpose; and when you had done it, would make the most of it. But don't want me to go any farther! you'll strain the string 'till it breaks: they won't think so well as they ought of you.

You are a very generous man, Sir *Crisp*! that all must allow, by your pamphlet; for you do a great deal more than you promised: and who would not wish to crown the robe of justice with the wreath of generosity!

When liberality ceases to be the ensign of justice, it will cease to be the ensign of honour.

You promised us only an account of your conduct; but you have added what ought to be our judgment upon it. You promised us no more than facts, but you have added to the plums of truth the paper and packthread
of

of reasonings; you promised only to state cases, but you have drawn conclusions.

How much are we obliged to you! it is therefore I am thus early to pay my gratitude; we might have mistaken many parts of your conduct, if you had not been pleased to mark out its candour and ingenuity; we might have thought you officious in this place, and rash in another; in this instance too remiss, and in another precipitate. How obliged are we to you for these assistances to our judgment; it was kind to help a set of poor ignorant mechanicks, such as some of us I am afraid are; and, honourable Sir, we thank you.

I thank you for one, and I do it most devoutly; for I am very sensible that I should never have thought of your conduct in the manner you tell me I should, in some instances, if you had not directed me this way by your reasonings.

If you had given us nothing but the facts, even as you have yourself related them, we should never have judged as you intended in all respects; and then no mortal creature would have got any thing by the pamphlet but Mr. Deputy *Hodges*.

You told us, you would only state the facts, and leave us to judge of your conduct: that was to be our business; but you have taken the trouble off our hands intirely.

There's a story in *Joe Millar's* jests, of a lady that turned away her woman for being
too

too great with her husband : huffey, says she, I took you to do your business, not mine ; and so sent her a-packing.

I only tell you a good story, Sir *Crisp*, I hope no body will make applications.

It might be dangerous to have left us to ourselves, for who knows but we might have made quite different observations.

I say nothing to your stile, tho' some of our ward call you the *barking Orator*. There were cooks enough in that kitchen to have spoiled a sea of pottage.

We shall see hereafter whether we cannot distinguish, in the several parts of it, the energy of the Bar-advocate, the argumentation of the *Robin-Hood-orator*, and the keenness of the *Aldermanbury-solicitor* ; all engrafted upon the pompous declamation of *Hart-street*.

You are found, O most candid addresser of the Livery ! I know where to ferret out every hair of the bleach rabbit skin, that would be forc'd upon the world for Ermin. I have not been myself in the oven for nothing.

I know where to look for the added force, or the added smartness ; as well as if I had seen the blot ; the pinn'd on paper, or the interlineation. I can see where the additional spirit pops up its little head, and stares at us ; I can distinguish where it pleads, and where it squabbles, out of time, and out of tune ; and I can see where it would cut if it had but an edge.

I can

I can distinguish every patch of tissue that is stuck upon the flowing robe; and for the ground-work itself, I have not read so many reams of sounding nothing, without being able to find to whom that belongs, in spite of ten transcribers.

Sir *Crisp Gascoigne*, to give you an address, for your address; I know you as well as you know yourself: and I will lay you as naked before all the world, as if you had disclosed your heart without reserve or favour.

You have been a very judicious magistrate; you are a very upright man: this is your character, and be content with it; let's hear no more of this heroic virtue.

Your own heart perfectly approves of your whole conduct. Well said Pharisee! you are in the temple: we should have judged whether a good heart ought to have approved it. Remember, Sir, the publican went home in better case, who said, *God be merciful to me a sinner.*

He who appeals to the public, puts himself upon a trial by his country. We have no proof of this: we admit no man to be evidence in his own cause. This stands for nothing.

You were generous not to publish the work while the trial of *Canning* was depending, because you knew the weight your justification must have against her. You judge of your pamphlet as you speak of your heart, modest Sir

B

Crisp

Crisp Gascoigne ! there are those who say *hang choice* if you ask them when it should have been printed.

But, Sir, if we give you all the weight, your mighty importance is pleased to allow itself, how does your great candour and great impartiality appear.

You would not publish this formidable justification while *Canning* was to come to her trial; but your great humanity brings it forth now; just when she is under the double weight of sickness and a sentence: just when the court of aldermen were deliberating upon an act of clemency to her; and which they have now proposed and carried, Sir, in spite of this opposition, and all others.

You are very ready to ask questions, but you answer them yourself; if you will ask me what you should have done on this occasion, I shall tell you. Your humanity should have kept it back till she was shipped off. There is no election coming on now: it would have been time enough when she was gone to have justified your character.

I love consistency in men's actions, because I love truth; if it was your humanity that occasioned your delaying it hitherto, your humanity should have delayed it still. If there was any other reason, I don't ask you to tell it; but what harm would it have done you to be silent.

You

You are very civil to Mr. *Roberts* and Co. when you say they attested things under their own hands, when they knew nothing of the matter ! it shews well in an Address to the Livery of *London* ; and they know how to thank you.

I am got, Sir, to your fourth page ; for I consider you methodically : and here I find a copy of a letter from Mr. *Ford*.

I hope it is an exact copy : the original may be come at. Will Sir *Crisp Gascoigne* warrant that it is an exact copy ! doubtless he will, or he would never have put it into his Address to the Livery of *London*.

Of this a Liveryman and you may possibly speak more hereafter. Not that I suppose there is any material difference, that cannot be imagined : but when a copy is given, I would have a strict and exact copy : this we may talk of when they have been compared.

In the mean time, the letter puts so many odd things into my head, that I cannot help asking you two or three questions.

I observe, Sir, that this letter is written in the same particular manner, with your Address, and that is a very peculiar manner : in the same stile, and in the same quick, short, snip-snap paragraphs.

The parson of *Abbotsbury*, and the under-sheriff of *Dorsetshire*, whose letters you have inserted also, write in one plain and continued way, like other people.

In *Abbotsbury* and at *Dorsetshire* they write as they do in other places; but at *Barking* they write as they do no where but in *Aldermanbury*; and in *Aldermanbury* they write as they do no where in the world but at *Barking*.

I want to know, Sir, how these two several stiles, so very peculiar, come to agree with one another.

In plain *English*, Can a man be answered which of these three things is the cause? Did Sir *Crisp Gascoigne* write Mr. *Ford's* letter? Or did Mr. *Ford* write Sir *Crisp Gascoigne's* Address to the Livery of *London*? Or did somebody else write both of them?

You'll pardon me, Sir: but in publishing your Address, you invite a publick Reply. Which of these three things was true? Or was ne'er a one of them?

There is one thing more these letters put me in mind of, and it must out: these letters are troublesome things, they will remain for ever.

The vicar of *Abbotsbury's* letter to Mr. *Ford* is dated the fifth of *March*; and there is another letter from the same gentleman, directed to Mr. *Bun*, dated the twenty eighth of *February*.

Take care, Sir, that we don't, by the date of this letter, and by your own acknowledgment, take from you the whole merit of this great achievements.

If you should not prove, upon enquiry, to be the original discoverer of the *Gipsey's* innocence,

nocence; we are to look somewhere else for the first patrons of publick justice, and vindicators of the laws of our country.

I suppose the letter was wrote first that got the first answer: and if so, What is the consequence?

If Mr. *Bun* first wrote to *Abbotsbury* for proof of the Gipseys being there; and if justice *Lediard* first argued *Virtue Hall* into the Design of a Recantation; I want to know, what it was that Sir *Crisp Gascoigne* discovered in this mighty affair. I say what he discovered; for every body knows how he acted upon the discovery.

As to Mr. *Bun*, it is very well known judge *Gundry* desired, or, if you please, directed him to write; and you say yourself, you did not know so much as where *Virtue Hall* was, till doctor *Hill*, WHOM YOU NEVER SAW BEFORE, told you.

You ask us, Sir *Crisp Gascoigne*, what effect these letters of the parson and the sheriff, and the certificates of the alehouse-man and farrier, would have had upon us! here you are right; this question throws your understanding, as well as your integrity, upon the proper justification.

We are a set of plain men, and these things would have had the effect on us they ought. I thank you for asking us the question; but I don't thank you for answering it yourself.

Sir,

Sir, permit me to say you are too forward.

This is Sir *Crisp Gascoigne's* Address to himself; not to the Livery of *London*.

But to stick to the question: for as you ask it, I shall give you one more answer. The question is not unnecessary; nor were the effects it would have had on us the same it appears to have had on you.

It would have convinced us of the Gipsy's innocence, provided *Abbotsbury* was so righteous a town, that fix rogues could not be found in it: but it convinced you of *Canning's* guilt at all adventures.

These are two distinct things, though you are pleased to confound them; the Gipsy may have been at *Abbotsbury*; and yet *Canning* might have been robb'd at *Enfield*.

If a terrify'd girl, scarce recover'd from a fit, and half in the dark, mistook the face of a Person, who had treated her with the most horrible barbarity; was that a reason why she should be prosecuted as a criminal!

Was that to be to Sir *Crisp Gascoigne*, who took the part of an old woman of an infamous profession, out of the very overflowings of humanity, a reason why she should be treated as an impostress. 'Tis a coarse word, but permit me to say, Fie!

The identity of the Gipsy was necessary to be proved, for another Gipsy might have been

been the Person at *Abbotsbury*. If another, she ought not to escape punishment; if herself, humanity and justice plead that she should not suffer.

You ask at whose expence this was to be done: and this, Sir, is another of the questions I shall answer. It was to be done at the expence of the City of *London*: not at your's, Sir, nor at any private person's whatsoever.

The City, Sir, was concerned in this, not you, any more than as one of its officers; and it is not decent in you, permit me to tell you so, to make this boast about it.

The transaction is scarce yet over, and your modesty might have permitted you to delay this publication a little longer: at least to delay the boast of this expence, till you had seen whether the City of *London* chose to be obliged to one of its officers, though the principal, for taking the business of the common purse upon him; or whether it would permit any man to injure his fortune, by an honourable discharge of his duty.

Sir, an *Address* to us was proper, but it might have been a *private Address*. An *Account* of your conduct was necessary; but you should have left to us the determining upon it: for, if I am not mistaken, 'tis we, and not your own heart, that should absolve you.

Your publick Address seems levelled not so much for yourself, as against *Canning*; your
own

own justification of your conduct seems to speak your doubts what we should think of it.

Permit me to tell you, as you once told Mr. *Fielding*, Sir, the magistrate should be of no party. *Canning*, under sentence, has as much title to your humanity, as the Gipsy. 'Till sentenced, she had as much right to your protection.

The friends of *Canning*, you complain, had declined to tell you, where *Virtue Hall* was. If people are to be accused, 'tis fit that should be done with candour. I call upon you, Sir, to answer, Did you ever ask them fairly?

Sir, be pleased to understand this as a demand of theirs, and a demand to which they have a right to expect your answer.

They have characters, however you are pleased to treat them; and they intend to defend themselves: they insist therefore upon this charge being made peremptorily.

But to the present purpose; what matters it, whether they told you where *Virtue* was or not: one would have thought, Sir, you could have found that without assistance. Was it so difficult for a Lord Mayor of *London* to find where a girl was, who was a prisoner, at least, who was in a prison.

What means had Dr. *Hill*, which Sir *Crisp Gascoigne* had not? or how could that be so difficult to a supreme magistrate, which that egregious gentleman, with no power but impudence,

puudence, no authority but an impertinent officiousness, did so easily!

You will pardon my manner of speaking of him. As I use perfect freedom with yourself, I shall not be under any great reserve about your ministers.

It was a great surprize to you, that *Canning's* friends came with *Virtue Hall*, when you sent for her: it was also a surprize to them, that you, who told them you would communicate to them every step you took, did not inform them of your sending for her.

To me neither one nor t'other is surprizing. You did not think proper to tell them what you wanted with her, till you had tried if you could obtain it: they did not chuse to leave her to you, if they could help it, without being themselves present.

Who could tell but the *authority* of a Lord Mayor might have as much weight as the *threats* of Mr. *Fielding*. You have told us, they made her make a recantation of her first account given before Mr. *Teshmaker*; they did not know but you might make her recant her recantation.

You did get her from them, in spite of their caution, and to be sure, the event falsified their fears! they were no conjurers in this matter!

It needed not have been a surprize to you, that they who supported her were informed of so material a transaction as the Lord Mayor

of *London's* sending for her : nor will it surprise any man in the world, but you, that they came with her.

When you examined her publicly, you confess she would make no recantation : and you repeat the question, What should we have done ?

I have no right to answer for more than one ; but I solemnly assure you, for myself, I would have sent her back again.

I would never believe that to be truth, which dar'd not face all the world ! what power had *Canning's* friends over her ? were not you there for her protection ?

I am no friend to closeting : and I must tell you, that altho' that *sanctifying* gentleman you name was present, I should have had ten times the opinion of her recantation, if two things had not happened.

If *Dr. Hill* had had no hand in the persuading her to make it ; and if she had made it publicly, before the world, and before the friends of *Canning*.

Now, Sir, we come to the bed-gown : you have promised, or some people who pretended to be in your secrets, have promised for you, that you would put this bed-gown upon the proper owner — Do that, and you have proved the guilt, or the innocence of *Canning* : but that is not done in this Address. An author is a good trade, witness the doctor's chariot : we shall have, I suppose, another.

You

You say, my Lord, that the girl told you the bed-gown was her mother's: if this be true, the girl has indeed put it upon the right owner; but not Sir *Crisp Gascoigne*.

You have no more right to the merit of this, Sir, than of the Recantation of *Virtue Hall*, or of the *Abbotbury* discovery. Plainly, unless you can prove Sir *Crisp Gascoigne* to be judge *Gundry*, justice *Lediard*, and *Elizabeth Canning*, Sir *Crisp Gascoigne*, with all this pretence to the discovery, has made no part of it.

He has spent the money, I hope, of the City, in prosecuting the publick business: nothing more. He has acted as a diligent magistrate, in a case that came before him; and he deserves no farther praise. The discovery of the imposture, if it be one, belongs to others.

But I have not done with this bed-gown: Sir *Crisp*! 'tis but a tatter'd robe for one who has been a Lord Mayor of *London*; yet I must take the liberty for a moment to try how it will fit you.

There are those, I am told, who are ready to attest, that the girl did not say it was her mother's bed-gown, but that she said she must carry it to her mother's.

These people had ears, Sir, and I am told they have characters: if they should take it into their heads to swear this, what will become of your Address. It would ill become

Sir, *Crisp Gascoigne*, to tell any thing to the Livery of *London* but truth.

That cause which needs other support, deserves none.

But suppose the girl did say it was her mother's bed-gown. I suppose, Sir, it might be understood at that time to be her's; for nobody would be likely to claim it: if it was her's; Sir, it was her mother's; for every thing that was this poor girl's was her mother's; and what is to be made of such a confession! if she spoke the words, she meant no other. Her friends have done well to advise her better; since no *Lediards*, you find, Sir, could get her to any more confessions. You see how necessary a thing is silence.

But, Sir, I have not yet done with this ragged article of our enquiry. With what intent was the gown detained? Were any steps taken to discover whose it was? yes. You were in *hopes* the washerwoman would have proved it to be her mother's. You were in hopes! Sir, What right had you to *hope* about it? it became you to enquire: *hope* speaks passions, and a party.

You did cause means to be used in *Alder-manbury*, to see if you could get it own'd; because, if own'd there, it would prove she was not absent.

It was not own'd, and you must permit me to say, this is some argument that she was elsewhere.

But

But now, Sir, Why did not you cause the same enquiry to be made at *Enfield*? there are washerwomen at *Enfield*, as well as in *Aldermanbury*. Why might not they discover to whom it belonged, as well as the others?

Perhaps you did not *hope* it should be proved to belong to any body at *Enfield*; because it would have prov'd then, that she was absent; and that she was there.

I think one enquiry was as necessary as another: impartiality, if it had made one, would have made both. Both were not made that I ever heard: one I heard was. What then made that one? for it was not impartiality.

Sir *Crisp Gascoigne*, I am trying your motives by your conduct. God only knows mens hearts; and in the search of truth, I will not believe what any man shall say of his own, if his actions declare against it.

Whatsoever I am, Sir, I respect you as much as I ought; I would have the world respect you so much; but I would not have one man in it respect you a jot more.

That you have not been the discoverer of the Gipsy's innocence, if she be innocent, is certain; for I have shewn who were the discoverers. That you have not proved the imposture of *Canning*, if that be proved, is as certain; for I have shewn who did so prove it.

These things you did not do: but I would willingly allow what you did. You ventured
your

your own money, which I suppose will be returned to you, because it ought to be; and those who are to return it will not fail to do every thing they ought. In this you acted as a man of spirit and generosity.

I would fain think, that as you acted the part of a discerning magistrate through all, so in all you acted the part of an impartial one. Sir, it remains upon you to explain this article.

I charge nothing against you, for I may be misinformed. If you caused enquiry to be made where a discovery would have proved the poor girl's guilt, you ought to have caused enquiry to be made also where a discovery would have proved her innocence.

Sir, in one word, did you, or did you not, cause enquiry to be made at *Enfield*? Was any enquiry made there? Or was there none?

If none, may there not be people at *Enfield* who yet know this bed-gown? May they not yet declare it? May not the discovery be yet made? And would it not be proper yet to make it? What if, after all, this girl should be found innocent! She may be innocent, and you (except in this article) not to blame in any thing; and if innocent, she is the most injured subject in *Great Britain*.

Sir, if no enquiry has been made about the gown at *Enfield*, who knows but the girl's friends may say, your detaining it, prevented their proving her innocence.

They

They may say, that you detained it to take away from them that opportunity of proving her innocence. This would bear hard upon you.

In all this I suppose the bed-gown was detained, and that enquiry was made at one place, and not in another. I understand the matter so; and if in this, or any other circumstance, I err about facts, you will easily answer me.

I have no particular knowledge of circumstances: I hear what is reported, and I suppose it true. I shall be ready to be convinced if I err: for I am impartial.

One thing I think should have been done, and it would have shewn impartiality. A Reward should have been offered for any one who would prove to whom the bed-gown belonged, whether to *Wells* or *Canning*.

I would have had it cry'd in both places: you have not stuck at expence in other articles, Why, Sir *Crisp Gascoigne*, was not this done?

I think the bed-gown rests upon your shoulders, till you attempt to find out to whom it belonged, by an impartial enquiry.

You have given us some evidences, that the Gipseys was not at *Enfield* till long after the time of the pretended robbery.

This may be true; and yet the robbery may not be a pretended one: for *Elizabeth Canning* might be robb'd at that place and time by another.

I

You

You say, many other persons offered to give proof of the same thing ; but you thought it unnecessary.

Pardon me, Sir ; this seems a great error, or a mere flourish : in a matter so disputed, I should have thought no proof unnecessary.

You tell us, in spite of all this, *Canning's* friends were still *pleased* to doubt. Sir, this is a very serious matter, and you promised to deliver yourself with plainness. The expression is unbecoming, and unfair : what you have to say, speak ! no insinuations !

I suppose they still did doubt ; and that they did it, not because they *pleased* to doubt, but because it appeared to them that they had reason.

While twenty people *offer'd* to you their evidence, that the Gipsy came long after to the place ; twice twenty *gave* them their evidence, that she was there at the time of the robbery. This was their reason for doubting. I use your expression.

Fortunatus (*Fortune natus* I think you spell it) swears, that he lay in the room ; and therefore you believe him.

Elizabeth Canning swears, she was confined in the room ; and therefore they believe her.

This is the state of the case : mark the partiality of your reasoning.

You condemn them for believing a single fact upon oath, while yourself also believe a single fact upon oath : Why are they blameable in this,

this, and you commendable? but your own heart approves you: their's, Sir, approves them. The reason is parallel.

You pursue this point; and you shall give me leave to use the same method of arguing. If it is of force with you, it is of force with me also.

If Fortunatus and his Wife did not lie in this room, you say, where did they lie? the contrary has never appeared.

I answer,

If Elizabeth Canning did not lie in this room, where did she lie? the contrary has never appeared.

The words are the same, changing the names of the persons: if therefore it be an argument for one, it is an argument for the other.

I shall not prosecute this manner of enquiry, for it might look like petulance, which I despise: but your arguments in general may be used for *Canning*, as well as for the other. I have known men who never argued on one side of a cause, but they proved the other. The world is happy when such men set out in the wrong.

That I may not seem to assert without reason, let me state the next sentence.

If Ezra Whiffin, you say, was not in the room upon the 18th of January, or did not see Judith Natus there, what should induce him to swear it?

D

I sup-

I suppose I do not mistake the sense of this passage. I take it you mean, the man could have no reason for swearing but because it was true; therefore it is true.

This I take to be your argument: if it be any other, inform me.

I answer,

If Mary Squires was not at Enfield-wash before the time when your witnesses swear that she came thither? What should induce their witnesses, who are of equal credit at least with Ezra Whiffin, and with Fortune Natus, to swear she was.

These persons could have no reason for swearing she was there at the time, but that it was true; therefore it is true, because they swore it.

I might go on with you, Sir, but it is not necessary.

If you ask me whether they or the others swore the truth, I do not know; nor, Sir, do you. It is a dreadful thing when oaths oppose one another.

I urge this as a proof that men may swear what is not true, without having any inducement at all to swear it. They may swear it thro' mistake: the want of inducement is no proof. That is all I argue in this matter.

To attack the absent, is as disingenuous as to attack the dead. You fall heavily upon Mr. Fielding. That useful magistrate is in another

ther kingdom, endeavouring, perhaps vainly, to recover that health, which he had sacrificed to application in his country's service.

This is a circumstance, Sir, that should have made him sacred from all slander.

But we will examine the charge. You insinuate, that he was wrong in preferring the account given by *Canning*, to that offered by *Virtue Hall* and *Judith Natus*.

You give as the reason for this insinuation, that you cannot comprehend why he did it.

Sir, those who know that gentleman's knowledge and understanding, will be convinced that he might have reasons, tho' another magistrate could not comprehend them.

Your not knowing why Mr. *Fielding* acted in such a manner, will never be received as a proof that he acted without cause. I am sorry for more reasons than this, which is of little significance, that he is not here to answer.

You boast, that the greatest and the wisest person in these kingdoms (I am not worthy to repeat his title) approved of your proceedings.

Sir, I, who question your Address, do not deny that I approve of your proceedings: your enemies will allow, that, supposing you have declared your heart, any man must approve your proceedings; to whom you gave the love of justice as your *real* motive.

After the proofs you had taken of the Gipsy's innocence, your humanity, you say, could no longer plead for *Canning*. The friends

of *Canning* would be glad to know, Sir, when your humanity did plead for her.

Nay I, who am perfectly impartial, and seek only truth, would be glad to know when that was. I see no proof of it in all your own account of your conduct : and as law supposes all innocent till convicted ; humanity ought to allow the same.

We have gone thro' your conduct thus far, Sir, hand in hand together ; and we will, in the same open, free and impartial way, go thro' the rest.

It becomes honest men to act thus. It behoves a Lord Mayor of *London* so to act, that his conduct will bear the strictest scrutiny : and when he has appeal'd to the publick, it becomes that publick to judge with candour, and to speak with freedom.

I hope I have so judg'd, and so spoken : I would shew myself what I am, of no party : the friend of no-body but the honest, of nothing but justice.

We now come, as you rightly say, to the great question that respects your conduct, and I hope we shall examine it with impartiality.

When you had, by following the steps pointed out by upright and discerning men, prov'd to the world the innocence of the Gipsy ; when you had, by adding the authority of your office, carry'd into execution what they propos'd ; and had so represented the proof of
that

that woman's innocence, that she obtain'd a free pardon ; the question is, whether you shou'd, or shou'd not have proceeded farther.

The words are ambiguous ; let us state the question plainly. When you had sav'd the Gipsy, should you, or should you not, have prosecuted *Canning*.

This is a very material point. You make it a question, whether you shou'd or you shou'd not have proceeded.

Permit me to answer that question, and say, *You should not.*

You seem to confound two things very distinct. The innocence of the Gipsy, and the guilt of *Canning*. They are not necessarily connected : that the Gipsy did not rob *Canning*, is no proof that *Canning* was not robbed.

This I assert, and this is the true way of reasoning upon important matters.

Supposing the Gipsy to have been prov'd innocent : might it not be possible, that she, who was thus treated, might mistake the person ? and if this was possible, cou'd it be proper that she should be engaged in so unequal a combat, as the supporting herself in a mistake, against the authority of a Lord Mayor of *London*.

We say, 'tis better ten guilty escape, than one innocent be punished : there never was a case in which the rule ought to have had more weight against a prosecution.

Thus

Thus much, Sir, for the matter of justice : now let us consider it with respect to humanity.

I wou'd view it in this light, because you say humanity was a great motive. I hope what you have alledg'd as your motives, were your *real* motives, and I will endeavour to reconcile your conduct to them, or to shew where it differs.

Humanity taught you to suppose the Gipsy innocent, even against her sentence ; because some persons swore what seem'd to clear her.

Humanity ought to have taught you to suppose *Canning* innocent, for there were less oppositions, and as many swore in her favour.

A girl of fair character had as much title to your compassion, as a woman of an infamous denomination. Why was it not extended to her ?

Shall we say, because it was not, that you had some other motive, altho' you name humanity ?

We will suppose the Gipsy to have been wrongfully accus'd : she was condemn'd, we will say, upon mistaken evidence. You sav'd her from the sentence ; in that you vindicated the honour of the laws. Why was you to go farther ?

Was you, who had just rescued a person, because she appear'd innocent to you, and many others ; to attempt the punishment of
one,

one, who appear'd, and who appears yet, innocent to as many!

My opinion is positive, that you should not have proceeded. You had sav'd the innocent, supposing it so: you had prevented the abuse of laws and justice, and you had done enough to deter others from such attempts. Was not this sufficient!

Reasons there might be for proceeding farther, but humanity was not one of them. Humanity disclaims the practice.

You say, in this you will submit to the opinions of your constituents; in that declaration you are right; but, Sir, why should they need you *to guide their judgments*.

It has been indeed your practice throughout the Address: but sure it was not prudent in this manner to avow it. The words escap'd the pen: you could not mean them. To guide men's judgments is to influence them: you wish'd, you say, to be judg'd with impartiality.

You say, *Canning* was guilty in the same degree in which the other was innocent: the phrase is nonsense, but that I shall excuse you: I ask upon what authority you pronounce she was guilty at all.

Should you bring her to justice, you say, or should you let her escape unpunish'd? unless assur'd of her guilt, I think you should have let her escape unpunish'd. Of her guilt you cou'd not be assur'd: and therefore you should have let her go.

I may

I may err, but I do not think it proper any more for a magistrate to engage himself in a prosecution, than to take fees.

No one, you affirm, will say the detection of such an imposture is not of the last consequence to publick security. I shall answer you, that it is not of the first consequence: it is enough, that the imposture had not its effect. The pardon of the Gipsy was sufficient to shew the condition of the publick security.

I do not allow that the *difficulty* of a prosecution made it the more necessary to set one on foot: I do not see that there was any *danger* in it: nor do I know that any such faction as you name was formed. Men of candour and integrity deny it.

Sir, let me add, that in the following paragraph you are too free with private characters. You speak of those who were at the head of that faction. The world will understand whom you mean by that expression; because it is no secret who were the girl's principal friends. You might as well have called them by their names: nay, having named her principal friends, I think you have called them by their names already.

You say, these men believed the girl an impostress, and yet protected her.

It is incumbent upon you, Sir, to prove this. The reflection is a very heavy one. To protect an impostress, against a man's own conscience,

conscience, in the scheme of an imposture, is to be guilty of that imposture.

It is to deserve whips, pillories, and transportation : See, Sir, of what you accuse these persons : remember that they are men of character ; and that it becomes you, nay, it is necessary that you retract your words ; or prove them.

You say, they thus disingenuously protected her, in opposition to you.

It ill becomes you also to say this, unless you can prove it true ; and as I believe it not to be so ; I believe that proof impossible.

Your office, I agree, was of great importance at that time ; but if they opposed that, they opposed the Mayoralty of *London*, not *Sir Crisp Gascoigne*.

If you suppose you have any other importance, you mistake yourself as much in that as in the supposed opposition.

Sir, let me ask you one plain question : that will prove whether or not they believed the girl an impostress, and supported her from this imagined opposition.

Were these men ever your enemies before ? or did they become so upon your conduct in this matter ? I beg this may be answered fairly : it will determine all. I think I could answer it for you.

If they were your enemies before, they might oppose you for that reason ; but if they were not your enemies before, it is more like-

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ly

ly they opposed you from a belief of the girl's innocence; and that your charge is unsupported.

You say, your heart told you, that what you did, your duty and your station required. What you did in saving the Gipsy, believing her to be innocent, they both doubtless did quire of you.

What you did against *Canning*, even tho' you believed her guilty, I think they did not.

I am suspicious of those who accuse others of dissingenuity.

You say, every man owes to the publick his example. It is a noble sentiment, and you have given to the publick a noble instance that you believed it.

Had you stop'd here, you say, what wou'd have become of the enquiry? what should, would have become of it. What that was, the world will tell you.

: But, in your usual way, as soon as you have ask'd the question, you answer it. You tell us what wou'd have become of it; and you tell another story.

Publick justice, you say, wou'd have been but half vindicated. I think it would have been vindicated entirely, for the accus'd had been excus'd from the sentence. That expected popularity, which he who sav'd her perhaps had in his eye, wou'd have been indeed but half effected: nor has it fared better by the farther measures.

Guilt,

Guilt, you say, had not been at all punish'd : first know, Sir, that it was guilt : for at this time (I follow the course of your pamphlet) you cou'd only guess it.

You add, that you must have remain'd under an insuperable load of obloquy, for having so far done your duty, because you had not done the whole of your duty.

Sir, if I understand you rightly, there never was a greater mistake than this.

You say, at least so it appears to me, that you should have been pressed with this insuperable load of obloquy, if after you had sav'd the Gipseys, you had not prosecuted *Canning*.

Who are the persons that lay this load upon you ? the friends of *Canning*. Would they have laid it upon you for not prosecuting *Canning* ? No certainly. They blame you because you did prosecute, and do, as they think, persecute her ; for they apprehend this Address an act of persecution.

Would they have censured you for not doing this ? Impossible. With what head is it possible you can conceive such perfect contradictions ?

You tax these persons heavily, Sir, when you say they protected *Canning* without any regard to law, decency, or their own characters. I hope you will say in which of their actions all this has been inferr'd. I do not see it.

You say, that they prosecuted the three countrymen, knowing them to be innocent. Your words are very express. You say they, THEN, knew them to be innocent. I hope you are able to prove this.

You speak of the insuperable load of obloquy under which you was then laid ; I am sure you have laid them under a very heavy one, but I hope not insuperable. Upon my word I am not one of them ; but I think it very incumbent on you to prove all this.

If they did know them to be innocent when they prosecuted them for perjury, they are wicked in the deepest degree ; and they ought to be render'd infamous.

If you can prove this, do it ! and make the world despise them : if not, I shall not say what that world will, or what it ought to think of you.

I am of neither interest ; but I speak as one of that publick to whom you have appealed ; and I deliver to you what I suppose their sentiments.

You say, the pardon of the convict was strongly oppos'd : By whom, Sir, was it oppos'd ? her guilt and *Canning's* were both uncertain, tho' you believ'd the one, and they suppos'd the other.

If any oppos'd her pardon, they were as cruel to her, as you have been to *Canning* in the prosecution,

You

You have said it : but 'tis proper you be call'd to justify what you have said : and believe me, Sir, there are many who think, and I am one of them, that this Address is a part of your conduct which needs justification, much more than any other which is pretends to justify.

If the pardon of the Gipsy was oppos'd, speak out, Sir, and say what was the opposition. To whom was application made, and what was that application?

So much proof appear'd at that time of the Gipsy's innocence, that I shall presume those inhuman and unjust who oppos'd her pardon : let the publick therefore know who these were, and what was the opposition : if not, we shall suppose there was not any.

This supposition, Sir, will be very injurious to you ; therefore it is your duty to remove it.

If we question the truth of one assertion in your Address, we shall question all : and what are they to determine of your conduct, who judge you have not related it fairly ?

That circumstantial information of *Nash*, *Hague*, and *Aldridge*, you say, was offered you much sooner than its date declares it to have been taken.

Sir, the information is of weight. Why was it not taken when it was offered ? I must confess,

confess, there appears to me in this place a shuffle in the account.

All disguise is unworthy him who has been a Lord Mayor of *London*, giving an account of his conduct to his constituents: let the thing be stated fairly.

The time when it was taken occasions conjecture. If it was offered sooner, let us know why it was not taken sooner. If it was not so offered, why should you say it was?

Beware, Sir, in your answers to these demands; for answers you must publish to them; and I warn you, means are taken to establish and prove the truth.

These *Gentlemen* were at first friends to the girl; you ask, What induced them to be so? They afterwards changed sides; you ask, What was the occasion? Is it of the Livery of *London*, Sir, you ask these questions? propose them to the men themselves.

They may have had inducements on either side, unknown to you or to us. As to their characters being above malice; I am ignorant, for I know no one of them: nor their title to the peculiar appellation of *Gentlemen*.

Is it true, that one of the *Gentlemen* is so humble as to keep a coffee-house.

You are full the importance of the Excise-man's evidence. But let me be heard upon the subject. In the mean time, understand me rightly, Sir *Crisp Gascoigne*, I am not questioning

tioning the innocence of the Gipsej, but your reasons for asserting it.

The Exciseman confirmed what the witnesses had said of her being at *Abbotsbury*: 'tis true, and great weight was added to the side you took by it. Yet perhaps all you would infer is not to be granted.

How could this man, you say, confirm all that had been said; but that it all was true.

He might have confirm'd it all, though it were all false, because he might have heard it all.

This you use as an argument against *Virtue Hall's* information, which agreed with *Canning's*. It is of as much weight in this case as the other.

You accuse Mr. *Fielding* personally of espousing *Canning*, knowing the Gipsej to be innocent. He is absent: but it would become your candour to use the same freedom with those who are at hand.

Why single out an absent person by name, and only hint at others? an absent person cannot answer.

Of this particular matter I know nothing: but I think if Mr. *Fielding* were here to defend himself, he would set your address in as foul a light, as your Orator stands in under the hands of *Veritas* *.

* See *Daily Gazetteer*.

Because the attorney employ'd by *Canning's* friends had duplicates of some oaths in favour of the Gipsy's innocence; you accuse those persons of knowing that she was innocent.

Sir, this is unfair. Are you sure that attorney communicated those unfavourable papers to them? or if you were sure of it, would you say there had not been one perjury in the case of *Canning*?

If others, why not these? at least, why should they be above suspicion.

The truth is, one circumstance often is enough to give you proof; but you will not permit them to receive conviction from a thousand.

What but the force of truth, you say, could produce so much unsought for evidence?

I have promised to answer all your questions. The force of perjury.

The friends and patrons of *Canning*, Sir, had also unsought-for evidence. What produced that? If nothing but the force of truth could produce such evidence, then theirs was also true.

There is not an argument you use, but serves their purpose as well as your own.

In defending the innocence of *Squires*; you have proved the innocence of *Canning*.

then

You are a good magistrate, Sir *Crisp Gascoigne*, but you are a miserable Reasoner. Both these things are not true, though your arguments equally prove both. Are you aware of the conclusion? Your arguments then prove neither. To what purpose have you written?

Upon the foot of such evidence, that is, upon the foot of your evidence, what part, you demand of us, should the friends of *Canning* have taken?

I answer with the same question.

Upon the foot of such evidence, that is, of the evidence they received, what part should they have taken?

You tell us, the part they did take; for you say, they protected the girl, and continued to prosecute the countrymen. You would have them determined as to what part they should take by the evidence: and, according to your argument, that was the part they did.

You say, *they thirsted for the convict's blood*. 'Tis a severe expression: if not true, I shall not add what should be said of it; or of you who speak it.

Did they? The Question is very plain, and to them very important. Did they thirst after the convict's blood, or did they not?

If they did, how came you to know it. Their actions speak only a defence of *Canning*:

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Did

Did they tell you this, Sir? if they did, you may affirm it after them.

Judge of your own heart, Sir *Crisp Gascoigne*; but not of that of any other person.

You are happy, if we allow you to have spoken truth of your own: you can have no knowledge of another's.

You triumph most victoriously in your twenty-eighth page over a poor word *therefore*: but let us enquire with what reason.

That very word is to prove these persons guilty of a malicious prosecution of the three countrymen. Because upon your continuing to prosecute *Canning*, they were advised to continue prosecuting these men, and have said, they *therefore* were advised to it; this is to be a proof they believed; this is to convince us they knew them to be innocent.

Is there not one word in your Address, Sir, that is carelessly inserted? is there not one word that might be accused of betraying the cause it was employ'd to defend? Whole sentences: and I have shewn them to you. But we take no such advantages.

We'll give you all your argument. It was *therefore* they prosecuted the men, because you prosecuted *Canning*. We will allow it: this does not prove that they knew them to be innocent.

Though

Though they supposed them guilty, they might have let them escape, if you had not prosecuted her: for all men are not such heroes in the cause of justice. But when you prosecuted her, it became them to use all possible means to prove her innocence: and this was one of the means in their power.

I suppose them sincere. But I am not of their council. This is an account of what might have been their motives, and I pretend to nothing more.

This overthrows your *therefore* argument: and it joins with all the rest in shewing you to yourself, as the worst reasoner that ever wrote. Shall I accuse you farther? but no matter. I think as honourably of your heart, as I think meanly of their heads who put together this pitiful vindication of your conduct.

As to the law business, of the removing the mens trials into another court, I neither pretend to understand it, nor think it worth mine or the publick's notice: only this I shall observe, the load seems to gall you, by the pains you take to throw it off your shoulders.

For the farther step of obtaining the *Certiorari's*, as you call them, unfairly; I think something should be clear'd up on that subject.

You accuse the friends of *Canning* of very base and very disingenuous practices. I suppose, if they were ask'd, they wou'd not allow that this is true.

I observe, that no man living has so good a hand at making uses of the dead. You say, the Lord Chief Justice who sign'd the *Fiats*, declar'd often he did not do it knowingly.

It is a material question: the dead cannot answer it; but let us see if we can have no assistance from the living. You say, there are those living who have heard him often say so. Sir, let us know one of these, and hear him but say, that he heard that great person only once of the often make this important declaration; and we will believe it.

If not — but I shall not take up your manner, and tell people what they ought to think about the assertion.

You are very eloquent upon the absence of the girl. — Is it wonderful that she dreaded such an enemy? what were all her friends to a Lord Mayor of *London*!

You enlarge upon the methods taken to procure her appearance! but what reason is there for all this rhetoric and oratory! her conduct may be accounted for with great ease and propriety.

She kept out of the way till it was quite necessary she should appear: and when that was, she made her appearance.

You

You call the comparison between her conduct and that of the three countrymen, a comparison between the conduct of guilt and innocence.

Change the phrase, and see how it will stand upon a new footing. Call it the difference between a person supported by a few inconsiderable persons; and that of three others protected by the Lord Mayor of *London*; and see whether that way it will not appear as natural. Where people may be innocent, and their conduct does not speak them otherwise, who shall call them guilty upon its misconstruction!

If the office of Lord Mayor were not enough to intimidate them into this; the person of *Sir Crisp Gascoigne* was; and who will wonder at the terror it produc'd.

You set out with communicating every step you took to the friends of *Canning*: you acted honourably and impartially. But did you continue to the end this conduct?

You confess in your thirty-second page that you did not: and, conscious of the necessity of that confession, you attempt to palliate your alter'd conduct with the reasons.

Sir, let me once again try you by your own arguments. *What was once right, you say, is always right.* Therefore having once prosecuted *Canning*, you cou'd not avoid to prosecute her.

Your

Your open conduct in this matter, was at least as right as your prosecution. Why then was it not always right, when it had been once right?

Other mens faults, supposing they had such as you describe, had no right to get the better of your virtues. You will find it impossible to vindicate this proceeding.

You wonder'd that *George Squires* could not remember the places at which he and his mother had quarter'd in their way from *Abbotsbury* to *London*: you were surpriz'd that he could not remember the names of above two or three of them,

O Sir *Crisp*! what must have been your astonishment, when he was question'd concerning his rout to *Abbotsbury*? he could not in that remember one.

To you his ignorance stood as a proof of his innocence: there were some, Sir, who drew a different conclusion from it at the time of the trial.

Upon the whole, if you should demand of me, whether I think *Canning* guilty of wilful perjury, or not; I should answer, that I do not know.

I know the respect that is due to the determination of a Court of Justice. I do not speak as influenced by that, but delivering my own naked thoughts, I am doubtful.

As to those persons who protected her, the question, with respect to their characters, is not

not whether she were innocent; but whether they thought her so.

They are many of them persons of such reputable and establish'd characters, that I cannot doubt but they thought her innocent.

I do not blame you for thinking her guilty now: but I think you determin'd that she was, too soon. Was not *Canning* in your breast, as you say *Squires* was with some others, condemn'd, as it were, before she was brought to a trial?

If you ask me what I think of the part you acted? I tell you, as I said in the beginning, that I think it highly laudable in the whole, if not quite unexceptionable in all its parts. That *Squires* is innocent, there can be no question: little of *Canning's* guilt.

I think you to be, and no one knows you better, as honest a man as lives; but I think, nay I know, you have too much ostentation.

You have acted the part of an honest man, and a good magistrate: but you are too fond of the glory that attends these characters.

Have you not been told, virtue is its own reward? be contented with that recompence.

You have convinced all who were impartial: but not those who had been misled before. Be satisfied with the praise of informing the reason, and do not claim the glory of having got the better of the passions.

You

You will be respected by the wise and the virtuous for ever: but do not give so much testimony of the respect you have for yourself.

All men allow you to have acted as an upright man, and a discerning magistrate; with spirit, and with the most strict impartiality. Is not this praise enough? Or what enemy have you so great as you are to yourself? Why would you drown all this under a torrent of vanity.

Would you had been content with mens good opinion, without courting their praise: that all allow you. Even I, who condemn your Address, applaud your conduct. What pity that the thing itself should be so much better than its vindication.

I set out with freedom, and I will not drop the familiarity. I'll tell you what I think of you upon the whole; and confess, that, if I judge rightly, as you have claimed more merit than belongs to you in the discovery: you would, (this is my opinion) boast more of the prosecution of it than is fitting.

You would be proud to say that you vindicated the honour of the City of *London*, at the expence of your own fortune.

You would be proud to say for life, you had laid the City of *London* under an Obligation.

I do not think it proper this should; nor do I believe it likely that it will happen. I suppose

suppose the City of *London* able to discharge its own offices, and suppose it above obligations to any private person. I doubt not but you will have the offer of your expence to be returned: if you refuse it, you are guilty of an insult upon the body, for which you profess so much respect; and you will betray the grossest affectation.

It is not fit the City of *London* should suffer any of its officers to prosecute its business at his own expence: it would deter others from their duty.

Let that regard you profess so loudly for the City, if an offer like this should be made to you, get the better of so idle an ambition; and shew yourself a good citizen, as well as a good man.

I am free in my praise, where you appear to me to deserve it; as I am in my just censure. I despise all pretences and disguise: would your Address had shewn you of the same character.

You will say, all men have their faults; indeed with all your virtues you have yours, and they are gross ones. But I have, to do you justice, rambled from my purpose. I am writing a Reply to your Address, not a panegyrick, or a fatyr.

You affirm many, who appeared for the girl, to have been guilty of perjury. 'Tis a home charge, it becomes you to retract, or make it

G

good.

good. 'Tis not time for you to rest, till you have done all the justice in your power; and in delivering the censure thus at large, you accuse the innocent.

In this, you are too rash; in many places you are to be praised for your moderation; nay, in the greatest part: but why should not a spirit, so much to your honour, have been carried thro' entirely!

Why am I throughout, in the same breath to praise and to condemn you?

You conclude with your most important article, the discovery where *Canning* was during the month of her pretended absence.

It is indeed important: it was worthy to be considered after all: and mankind were told, you would shew it clearly. Perhaps you think you have proved it. I am of opinion you have done nothing towards such a proof. I was displeased with many parts of your performance; but in this I was altogether disappointed.

Is this the event of all your earnest researches? Is this the mighty discovery we were so long promised? permit me to tell you, Sir, you have discovered nothing.

Whether the girl was or was not at *Enfield*, has been determined upon other considerations: but let me say, she may very well have been at *Enfield* all the time, for any thing you say to the contrary.

There

Three things you propose to clear up: *where she was, under whose direction, and what was the cause of her absence.*

Have you shewn all these? No. Have you shewn any one of them? Certainly no. Would it not have been better never to have proposed them?

You say she signed her informations with her mark, tho' she was able to write. If this be true, pray which of the three points does it discover? it has nothing to do with any one of them.

If it were as you represent, it might lead one to suspect she was an impostress; but it points out no part of the imposture.

Upon the first of *February* you allow her weakness might excuse her setting her mark, instead of writing her name; but you say, that cause could not hold to the seventh.

True Sir: but remember what yourself tell us; and blush for the unfair inference you draw from it.

You say, she carry'd to Mr. *Fielding*, on the seventh, an information ready sign'd: you do not pretend to say that she signed it on that day. It might be signed with her mark while she was unable to write.

Now what becomes of this mighty argument, there is great weakness in it, or great disingenuity. I do not pretend to determine which.

Sir *Crisp Gascoigne* is, on other occasions, very ready to tell us the dictates of his own heart. Let him speak them here.

The degree of dirt of her shift is a circumstance too uncertain to mention. Who shall say exactly how dirty linnen must be in such wearing. For the rest you have a fair account; and you can have no right to doubt the truth of it.

The mother of *Canning* has a right to be believed, till some one can accuse her of imposture.

You say, she and her daughter must have contrived the affidavits and the advertisements at first, because they agreed in the naming *Bishopgate-street*.

Sir *Crisp*, might they not agree by their speaking of them afterwards?

I allow the daughter ought not to have sworn to *Bishopgate-street*, because the mother had nam'd it in an advertisement, unless it were true, that she knew she was carried thro' it.

But this was a circumstance that could hurt no person: and the girl might wish to give authority to what her mother published.

Your suspicions about the story of the conjurer, permit me to tell you, Sir, are as rash, as the irony is awkward, in which they are delivered.

A foolish woman might go to a conjurer; and a conjurer, upon hearing her story, might guess that some bawd had got her daughter.

There is no miracle in this at all: and give me leave to say, it would have become Sir *Crisp Gascoigne*, addressing himself to the Livery of London, in all places to have been serious.

These Sir, are your arguments, and these are all your arguments, to prove that *Canning*, during her pretended absence, was under the direction of her mother.

They prove nothing.

The circumstance was not necessary for you to meddle with: but some infatuation seems to have hung over you, throughout this whole pompous and ridiculous Address.

Speak candidly; What would you at this moment give, that no officious agent, or foolish friend, had prompted you to make it?

F I N I S.